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Abstract: In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative
regulatory regimes: a global connectivity regulation (GCR) and an efficient component pricing
regulation (ECPRe). Whereas a GCR imposes a full quality of reciprocal interconnection, firms
will choose vertical product differentiation in order to lower price competition, while under a
ECPRe they will choose the maximum level of services quality and a global degradation of
connectivity. Hence firms’ decisions about whether or not vertically differentiate products seems
to be, at least partially, related to regulatory rules imposed on the market.
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21. Introduction1
The economic literature on networks is currently so extensive2 that it’s no more futile, as
a starting point, an attempt to clarify in which framework our analysis will be set. Many
relevant issues will not actually enter in our discussion, even if a large debate on them is going
on among economists.
From a very early paper by Rohlfs (1974) a day by day growing amount of contributions
on networks has tried to capture different economic features of this idea  changing perspective
where necessary.
Formally networks are always modelled as a set of links which connect several nodes
independently on the specific sense given to links and nodes in different contexts. Then a
theoretical preliminary problem is to understand how these links can be built and what is, if it
exists, an efficient outcome of a link formation game. In a very general set up, with an arbitrary
number of individuals, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) analyse efficiency and stability of networks
formed by self-interested agents who choose their different links to others. In more specific
frameworks, inter alia, Zhang (1995) studies network formation choices undertaken by firms
which have to sell goods in different cities, Hendricks et al. (1999) examine equilibria in link
formation games for the case of airlines routes and Kranton and Minehart (1998) study efficient
results of a link formation game in a two-sided market where a network is seen as a system for
exchanging goods. In what follows we will not discuss these kinds of problems assuming an
efficient outcome has raised from a previously played link formation game.
A particularly rich literature has devoted her attention on networks not seen as set of
bilateral relations among individuals3, but as a structure that relates many technological
components which are required to provide a certain service (among the others Katz and Shapiro
(1985), Farrell and Saloner (1986), Economides (1996)). This approach has lead to many
significant results related to issues on compatibility, interoperability and co-ordination among
different networks. These authors have studied problems of social optimality in network
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3interconnection and possible peculiarities of competition in network industries4. The main
common idea of these contributions is that a network effect, related with network externalities,
exists and, if sufficiently strong it can modify optimal conduct of profit maximising firms. Any
attempt to analyse network industries must take into account this effect in order to be realistic;
as we will see our model will consider a simple version this effect.
Another quite wide research field has studied competition among firms which can
choose a certain price-quantity combination for their services simultaneously with an efficient
network structure. When a firm can choose different ways to link two nodes in his network, it’s
meaningful to search the most efficient network structure that allows a service provider to be
more competitive and to obtain a larger market share and higher profits. In this view, a network
structure can be changed in order to exploit economies of density which can reduce average costs
and hence prices. Applications of this concepts fit particularly well in modelling airline network
rivalry (e.g. Oum et al. (1995), Brueckner and Spiller (1991), Brueckner et al. (1992)) or internal
organisation of firms (e.g. Keren and Levhari (1983)). However a networks structure not always
can be easily modified: telecommunication networks, for instance, require very high costs for a
change in their structure and this suggests to build it optimally once and to not modify them
frequently. In other words, we can say that airlines networks are quite peculiar because of their
low alteration costs differently from other networks. In what follows, we will refer to sectors in
which these costs are very high and it’s not possible to change an optimally built network.
Finally, we will suppose that different networks are owned by different firms which use
them for providing a certain service; this assumption rules out problem of public regulation of
access to a unique network managed by an central input monopolist for actual or potential
competitors (e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1994), Amstrong et al. (1996)), and it allows us to focalise
attention on competition between network operators who sell substitutes services. In this way
our model could be applied to liberalised telecommunication markets and commercial internet
markets 5.
2. Interconnection and Quality in Network Industries
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4In the last years the increasing economic role and weight of network industries has raised
several questions about how these industries operate, in which way using a particular input as a
network can modify competition among firms or what are strategic variables which can be
manipulated by a firm.
Starting from the well studied problem of the access of potential competitors to a single
network owned by a firm  (Laffont and Tirole (1996)), a crucial role was recognised to
interconnection and access pricing practices. The unit price of interconnection to a common
network can influence competitors costs and it can be used like an anticompetitive tool, or a
discriminatory device, in advantage of vertically related or cross owned firms.
Hence, a natural step forward has been to analyse the case of two firms, each with her
own network, which compete in the same market. Any firm manages a network of a given
extension formed by the number of attached consumers and provides services (as telephony,
data transmission, internet services etc.) basically connecting different nodes of her network.
Some of these services are on-net in the sense that they are completed inside the owned network
while some others may pass through other firm’s network connecting an on-net node with an
off-net one. In this last case an access price must be paid to competitors which offer
interconnection with their attached consumers.
In a fairly quoted model of horizontal differentiation in which price discrimination
among on net and off net servicies is not allowed, Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) have shown that
access charges are an instrument of tacit collusion in the case of a reciprocal access pricing
agreement. Additionally in the case of noncooperative access charges, they are a way to increase
competitor retail prices. Moreover whether the degree of substitutability of two services is very
high or for high access charges, each firm has incentive to corner the market and an internal
Hotelling equilibrium does not exist. Similarly, Carter and Wright (1999) have proved, again in a
Hotelling set up, that symmetric firms can effectively collude over retail prices by colluding over
access tariffs. Furthermore both firms can gain higher profits from full reciprocal interconnection
seen as a result of a Nash bargaining problem with no interconnection as the disagreement
point. In both models access tariffs are crucial strategic variables that can or cannot be subjected
to public regulation. The competitive game is characterised by manipulations of prices (and then
quantities) and access charges given a certain firms’ location.
Nevertheless relatively few models have tried to introduce into the analysis a quality
dimension of connectivity. In fact it seems reasonable and realistic to suppose that a firms can
concede to a rival different quality levels of interconnection in terms of compatibility of
5standards or interface capacity6. This possibility is studied by Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2001) in a
context of oligopolistic competition between internet backbones;  in a two stage game, where
firms first set the quality of interconnection then they choose capacities and prices, symmetric
size firms will choose high quality of reciprocal interconnection while, in case of asymmetry, a
dominant firm will prefer a lower quality of interconnection with a small rival. Furthermore, the
latter quality will be lower the higher her total installed base (i.e.attached consumers) is and the
smaller are benefits from network externalities (i.e. rival’s attached consumers). Thus, an
additional strategic variable becomes relevant and it can be used as an anticompetitive weapon7.
Bental and Spiegel (1995) are arrived to a similar result modelling quality competition among
firms, where quality of a network is identified with the number of attached consumers (i.e.
network externalities dimension of quality). In their model a slightly different problem of
compatibility is studied, but the basic intuition of their result is quite similar to Crémer et
al.(1999)’s one: incompatibility is a tool to restrict the market for a dominant firm.
As best as we know, no contributions have tried to deal with another dimension of
quality related to supplied network services. As rightly noticed by Crémer and Hariton (1999)
with respect to internet services, we can recognise at least two quality levels for network
services: low quality services with dial-up connection and small bandwidth and high quality
ones with permanent connection, high bandwidth, certified delivery times and secured
transactions. This vertical differentiation of supplied services is justified by different consumer’s
preferences (light and heavy users) and it implies different prices. The same intuition can be
easly applied to mobile telephony where we can recognise high quality services (written
communication, data transfers, e-mail etc.) and low quality ones (basic voice communication).
Hence, network firms can also compete offering differentiated contracts in terms of quality and
price.
In what follows, we will build a three stage model of competition between two
symmetric network firms which tries to deal either with problems of interconnection (in term of
access prices and quality) or with vertical product differentiation. In the first stage firms decide
interconnection agreements, in the second one they choose services’quality and then they
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profits and market share.
6compete in prices. In doing this, we will take as a reference point the well known Shaked and
Sutton’s (1982) model of vertical product differentiation8.
Our aim will be to study firms’ behaviour under two alternatives regulatory regimes. We
will assume that a regulator can establish a completely competitive interconnection agreement
with high quality of interconnection, reciprocal access price and balanced flows between the
two networks9 or it can simply impose an Efficient Component Pricing rule for access tariffs. In
the first regime a full-informed regulator wants to implement a set of rules for ensuring full,
advanced interconnection among networks. In opposition, in our second case, the regulator has
only general information about firms’ costs and it can only set a tariff scheme in order to relate
access charges to production costs. As we will see, firms’ behaviour will be strongly modified by
different regulatory frameworks.
The paper is organised as follows: in section 3 our model in introduced, in section 4 and 5
competition between two network firms is analysed under the previous two regulatory regimes.
Section  6 summaries conclusions and compares our results.
3. The Model
In this section, we will model a duopolistic market where two symmetric firms compete
for unattached consumers which have different preferences for quality. The two competitors
have the same starting installed based, hence without loss of generality we can assume it equal
to a positive number.
3.1 Demand side
In our economy there are heterogeneous unattached consumers k K= 1,...,  which buy
one unit of network service each, obtaining a utility given by
U s pk n n= -d (1)
                                                                
8 In fact we will use a slight modification of this model proposed by Tirole (1988).
9 In the rest of the paper let us refer to this case as global connectivity regulation.
7where sn is the quality level of the service provided by firm n =i,j at a price pn  and d  is a
parameter of preference for quality that goes from d, sufficiently high to ensure market coverage,
to d d= + 1. The quality of services provided by firm n is given by10
( )s q qn n n n n n= + +- -q a (2)
with qn  the installed base of network n (i.e. the number of attached consumers enrolled by firm
n), q n- the number of attached consumers which have signed a contract with the rival;
[ ]qn n- Î 0 1;  is interconnection quality that firm n concedes to firm -n and an ³ 0 the hedonistic
index related with the consumption of firm n’s services. Hence, the total quality of a service is
given by a network externalities component (Katz and Shapiro (1985)) and by a product specific
component in terms of kind of connection, delivery times etc. Under a null quality of
interconnection ( )qn n- = 0  each consumer can very difficulty reach nodes on the other network,
incurring in very high usage costs which nullify any network externalities component in sn  .
Let me denote the quality differential with Da a a= - -n n  and with Y D Y D= =d a d a,
respectively the maximum and the minimum monetary value of Da  for different consumers. As
usual, we can impose some technical conditions on our parameters:
Assumption 1: In what follows we assume that
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where c is the marginal cost of producing one unit of service equal, given our symmetry
assumption, for both firms.
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8and he will be indifferent from buying a unit of service from the two firms compensating an
higher price with higher quality; obviously the network externalities component will be
irrelevant in determining such an indifference condition in case of high quality of reciprocal
interconnection between firms.
3.2 Supply side
  For the supply side, we have two symmetric network firms n i j= ,  which compete for
unattached consumers. Each consumer buys one unit of service. Hence, the quantity qn
represents both total number of firm’s subscribers and total quantity sold in the market. Any
enrolled customer can consume on-net or off-net services therefore each firm will have a
proportion g n  of sold services that is completed inside her network and a proportion 1-g n  that
must be completed by her rival. For completing rival’s services, firm n charges an access price tn
to the other network firm and, symmetrically, firm -n does the same. Any unit of service has a
symmetric constant marginal cost c identical for on-net or off-net one, that is the cost of a transit
in firm n’s network. Hence, for a unit of off-net services a firm will pay the marginal cost of
production and the access price. Giving access to a rival implies a cost of delivery equal to
d cn n n= -q  where c is the marginal cost of on-net services and  q the quality of interconnection.
Decreasing q it will be lower the marginal cost of delivering rival's services11. Finally let we
suppose that serving a consumer involves a fixed cost f normalised, for tractability, to zero and
that price discrimination between on and off net services is not allowed.
The quantity sold by a firm depends on the quality si  and the retail price pi  and firms'
profit will be given by the sum of on-net profits ( )P non n n np c q= -g , off-net ones
( )( )Pioff n n n np c t q= - - - -1 g  and profits obtained by giving access to the rival
( )( )P nacc n n n nt d q= - - - -1 g  . Hence, for each network firm n i j= ,  total profits are given by
( )[ ] ( )( )Pn n n n n n n n np c t q t d q= - + - + - -- - -1 1g g (4)
With no regulation, it will maximise (4) with respect to p tn n n n, ,q -  and an .
                                                                
11 We can reasonably think that a low quality of interconnection  implies less priority and lower speed in transferring
packets and hence a lower marginal cost.
9In what follows, let we assume, for the sake of tractability, symmetric flows of services
between networks, that is the same percentage of average outflow traffic generated by each
firm's subscriber (i.e. gn = g for any n). Relaxing this assumption not only makes model results'
difficulty interpretable, but also adds a possible diversification strategy for service providers: a
different degree of specialisation in intra-network traffic and a consequently different quality
dimension of services targeted to class of users which give different values to intra-network and
inter-network traffic12. Since our first aim is to give some insights on possible effects' of
regulation on network competition, symmetry with respect to this dimension does not alter too
much our findings.
3.3 The Game
The competition between firms is described as a multistage game with complete
information: in the first stage firms decide interconnection conditions fixing tn and qn n-  , then
they choose a certain quality for services an  and, in the third stage, they compete in prices.
This structure seems consistent either with the spirit of Shaked and Sutton’s type of
models, or with an existing network firms’ practice of signing periodically interconnection
agreements13. Moreover, with an extensive form competitive game, we can simply introduce
regulation on connectivity by setting quality of interconnection and access prices, thus reducing
firms’ decision problem to a two-stage game. As usual, we will use a backward induction
procedure and we will derive subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
4. Vertical Differentiation under Global Connectivity Regulation
Let we suppose that a regulator imposes a global connectivity regulation (GCR) fixing
quality of interconnection and reciprocal access charges. Firms set in the first stage of the game a
certain level of quality for their services then they compete in prices. Using expression (3) and
recalling that consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [ ]d d;  we can obtain firms’
demands given by:
                                                                
12 For internet services different preferences about this quality dimension gives diversify users' demand of intra-domain
traffic (i.e. e-marketplaces, closed-web services etc…) and end-to-end connection. This will induce different technical
specialisation of networks and different marketing strategies for service providers. For a discussion of these issues see
Blake et al. (1998), Odlyzko (2000) and, for a bussiness oriented view, Picardi (2000).
13 For example Internet Protocol or Transfer Control Protocol.
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Obviously, it is possible, substituting (5) into profits, to derive profit functions in terms of prices
and qualities:
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )
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By construction, profits functions are twice continuously differentiable with bounded
derivatives and concave. As noticed above, firms are usually able to manipulate quality of
interconnection and/or access prices in order to gain higher profits using the access charge as
an instrument of tacit collusion or as a tool to obtain larger market shares. However, this is not
the case whereas a regulator imposes a particular interconnection agreement:
Definition 1: We define Global Connectivity Regulation (GCR) a regulatory regime where reciprocal
access ( )t t ti j= = and full quality of reciprocal interconnection ( )q qij ji= = 1  are imposed.
Under this regime firms’ profits only depend on prices and quality and we have a two
stage game with perfect information. A regulatory policy as in Definition 1 implies that
monetary flows balance and that transits on firms’ network have all the same marginal cost.
This regulatory policy requires a big amount of information on firms’ costs, activities and
technology and it seems consistent with observed interventions in these kind of markets
frequently oriented to reciprocity in interconnection conditions14.
In the second stage of the game, firms’ decision problem (for n=i,j) is
                                                                
14 For example 1995 Oftel’s consultative document or US Telecommunication Act (1996) underline the importance of
reciprocal access pricing.
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 where an  and a-n are firms’ first stage optimal choices about quality.
Now, we can prove the following
Proposition 1: Under GCR network firms will choose the maximum level of vertical product
differentiation and in equilibrium both firms earn positive profits.
Proof:
 Solving (7), given A1 and A2, it’s possible to get firms’ reaction functions in the second stage of the game. They
are respectively for firm i and j:
p
p c
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p c
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Thus, equilibrium prices in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium are
( ) ( ) ( )p p c ci j* *; ;= + - + -
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D D  . Substituting (8) into (5), it is immediate to check that
demands in equilibrium are equal to D Di j
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-
=
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3
 exactly as in Tirole (1988). The
equilibrium price vector corresponds to firms’ optimal second stage choice, then, going backward to the first
stage where decisions on quality are taken, each firm (n=i,j) will face the following problem:
[ ]
( )
a a a
a a
n
n n n n np p
Î
- -
;
* *max ; ; ;P
More precisely, each firm can choose the optimal level of quality15 in order to maximise the following
expressions:
                                                                
15 We are assuming the existence of a maximum and a minimum level of quality the former allowed by contemporary
technologies, the latter imposed by market regulatory standards.
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As we can notice, firm i will set the smaller amount of quality independently by rival’s choice and firm
j will behave the other way around selecting the maximum amount of quality into quality domain, that is
¶
¶a
¶
¶a
P
P
i
i
j
j
<
>
0
0
 Hence, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the optimal level of qualities for services are ( ) ( )a a a ai j* *; ;=
and the maximum level of vertical differentiation between firms’ services is achieved. By substitution it is
immediate to check that equilibrium profits are positive for both networks. 
Formally, looking at the proof of Proposition 1, we can notice a peculiar feature of the
model: each firm’profit depends linearly upon the quality of services. Competitors want to set a
boundary level of quality and they would increase even more product differentiation if it was
possible. An equilibrium is reached because services’ quality is defined on a closed interval and
firms will set upper and lower boundaries of such an interval; in other words, a local maximum
of profit functions, supposed continuous, coincide with one quality domain's extreme.
Intuitively, exactly as in Shaked and Sutton (1982), vertical product differentiation is
used as a tool for reducing price competition. Two kinds of services are sold in the market: low
quality services, in terms of connection and bandwidth, at a low price and high quality, more
expensive ones. Network firms provides services to different consumers (light and heavy users) at
different prices both earning positive profits16. In the case of a global connectivity regulation,
firms neither can manipulate reciprocal access charges, nor they can distort quality of reciprocal
interconnection in order to get competitive gains on rivals. Hence, vertical product
differentiation is the unique legal instrument to decrease market competitiveness, increasing
profits.
                                                                
16 This is, for instance, perfectly consistent with business practices of Internet backbones analysed by Crémer and
Hariton (1999).
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Nevertheless, a GCR simply imposes reciprocal access prices without determine their
values, which are fixed by network firms. As noticed by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) and
Armstrong (1998) in a framework in which operators must charge subscribers the same charge
for services delivered on or off net, access tariff could be used as a tool of tacit collusion on retail
prices and it may facilitate joint profit maximisation. In our model, collusion on access tariffs
will be the unique way in which a network firm may get positive profits if vertical product
differentiation is not allowed and it decides to manage rival's off net services. With no product
differentiation and networks interconnection, firms compete on prices undercutting rival's retail
tariffs; this will increase services' demand inducing losses for each unit of managed traffic.
Networks will react colluding on access charges.  More formally:
Proposition 2: Under a GCR, whereas vertical differentiation is not allowed, firms may decide to
manage only on-net services or to be interconnected colluding on access charges.
Proof:
With no vertical product differentiation ( )Da = 0  equilibrium prices are p p c ci j* *= = £g  and
equilibrium profits, for n =i,j, are given by
( )( )( )
Pn
t c
=
- - -1 3
3
g d d
(10)
In order to gain non negative profits networks can manage only on-net services ( )g = 1
earning zero profits (in this case p=c and we reach a Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium) or
alternatively reciprocally interconnect (g<1). In the latter case, retail prices are lower than
marginal costs hence each firm get selling losses. In order to compensate them, firms will
increase t adove d=c gaining higher access profits since (XXXX). Furthermore, for a given
collusive access price t', profits increase reducing on-net services XXXX.         
Finally, we may notice as a particularly tight regulation (reciprocal access prices, full
quality of interconnection, no products differentiation), combined with a severe prohibition of
collusion on access tariffs, involves a perverse outcome: each firm becomes a on-net service
specialised provider breaking connections with possible competitors.
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         5. Connectivity, Quality and Price Competition in Network Industries under ECP
Regulation
In the previous section, we have seen that network firms, under a regulatory policy
which impose full interconnection, will differentiate their products in order to weaken price
competition on retail services. Nevertheless, on the one hand, a GCR can be really difficult to
impose, on the other it requires a large amount of information to be implemented (on demands,
costs and network traffic...). Then, it can be meaningful to compare that kind of regulatory
policy with a weaker form of regulation which can be reasonably easy to impose with a small
amount of information (basically only on reported costs).
Whereas a regulator only has information on firms’ costs (marginal cost of production
and opportunity cost of access) a commonly used rule for determining access tariffs is the
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) (Baumol (1983),  Willig (1979)). We define, in our
framework, a regulatory regime inspired to this rule as:
Definition 2: An Efficient Component Pricing Regulation (ECPRe) is a regulatory policy which
simply impose a ECPR on reciprocal access prices. In particular access charges are set for n=i,j
as:
t cn n n= +-q b (11)
where b is the symmetric opportunity cost of access.
Under an ECPRe both firms can compete effectively not only on price and quality, but
also on reciprocal quality of interconnection.  In this case we have cost-based access charges
which depend on this quality level chosen by any network firm. For the sake of tractability we
will introduce, without loss of generality, a symmetric installed base equal to q . Logically, we
shall have a three stage game where in the first stage firms compete on quality of
interconnection, secondly on the quality of services and finally on retail prices. The unique
constraint they face is given by the rule (11).
As in the previous section, we can compute the Nash equilibrium in prices and, by
backward induction, we can analyse firms’ optimal choices in terms of services’ quality given
15
what was chosen in the third stage of the game. As it is possible to show, a firm’s demand
increases with respect to its installed base, giving account of the role of network externalities;
nevertheless, under an ECPRe where quality of interconnection can be manipulated in the first
stage, vertical product differentiation seems to disappear and an imitative convergence to the
maximum (into the restricted domain) level of services’quality characterises firms’behaviour.
More precisely:
Proposition 3: Under an ECPRe, both network firms will choose the maximum level of services quality
(no vertical product differentiation).
Proof:
See Appendix 1.
Let's do the final step. In the first stage of the game both players compete on
interconnection quality q taking into account an ECP rule imposed by a regulator.
Taking into account previous stages' outcomes we obtain that network firms will set a
symmetric level of interconnection quality in a SPE: the best reply dynamics leads both firms to a
global degradation of connectivity. The following proposition summaries this result:
Proposition 4: Under an ECPRe, a global degradation of interconnection quality is a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Proof:
 See Appendix 2.
Then, the effects of an ECPRe are a maximum level of services quality selected by both
networks and a global degradation on connectivity. Firms will not use, as usual, product
differentiation to lower price competition but they will prefer to implement a very bad level of
reciprocal interconnection. Thus, a precise business strategy phases out: to sell high quality
services to unattached consumers which, once attached, will have some difficulties to use other
16
firm’s services given a bad reciprocal connectivity between networks. In this case it is interesting
to notice the following:
Corollary 1: Under an ECPRe in a subgame perfect equilibrium a Bertrand Equilibrium is reached by
network firms.
Proof:
 It is sufficient to substitute results of propositions 3 and 4 in expression (A1) to get a level of price in the
subgame perfect equilibrium equal to c. 
The two analysed regulatory regimes imply two deeply different results in terms of
quality and connectivity: in the next section, as concluding remarks, we will compare these
outcomes.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analysed possible effects of different regulatory regimes on
competition between network firms (i.e. internet providers, mobile telephone companies etc.).
We have compared two regulatory policies, one particularly heavy (Global Connectivity
Regulation) aimed to impose a high degree of interconnection quality between firms, and one
softer (Efficient Component Pricing Regulation) which sets simply a ECPR on access tariffs.
Under a GCR firms cannot manipulate interconnection quality and access charges so,
quite traditionally, they will vertically differentiate their products in order to reduce price
competition on final services. A firm will produce high quality services and the other low quality
ones; both of them will get positive profits.
On the other hand, under a ECPR, networks are able to set any level of interconnection
quality; in this regulatory framework both firms will produce high quality services,
implementing a global degradation of reciprocal connectivity. Each firm will sell high quality
services on its network giving bad access to its rival and hence reducing off-net services’quality.
Both firms will strongly  compete on prices reaching a Bertrand equilibrium in the last stage of
the game, thus sharing market demand.
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Finally, from a regulatory perspective, a taught regulation of connectivity implies vertical
products differentiation, an high level of interconnection quality and a relevant segmentation of
market demand. In opposition, a lighter regulation involves no vertical products differentiation
(but convergence to high quality services) but a more competitive outcome in retail prices. Thus,
a regulator seems to face, in designing a regulatory regime for network industries, a relevant
trade-off  between global connectivity and market’s competitiveness.
Baake and Boom (2001) have recently argued that quality differentiation does not only
reduce price competition but also encourage the co-ordination for the achievement of
compatibility between firms in industries with network externalities. In our set up, a linkage
induced by regulation arises between quality differentiation and price competition: network
firms will chose product differentiation if they cannot decrease quality of reciprocal
interconnection; whereas a global degradation of connectivity is allowed by the regulator,
networks will choose to share market demand in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof is basically equivalent to the proof of Proposition 1 except for the constraints imposed
by regulation. If we maximise, with respect to prices, expressions (6) under A1, A2 and a
balanced flows condition, we get a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium given by:
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) [ ]
p c t t d d
p c t t d d
i j i i j
j i j j i
= +
-
-
-
- + +
= +
-
-
-
- + +
f f j g
f f j g
2
3
1
3
2
2
3
1
3
2
(A1)
with ( )j q q= -q ji ij . Substituting (A1) into demand functions, we obtain firms’ demand at the
end of the third stage:
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
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i i j i j
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-
- - +
f f g
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f f g
j
2
3
1
3
2
2
3
1
3
2
(A2)
As it is easy to check, these demands are increasing with respect to the installed base and
rival’s costs while they decrease when firm’s costs increase. Using (A1) and (A2) into (6) we can
obtain second stage profits which are maximised by both firms for services’ quality ( )an  taking
into account constraint (11). From first order conditions, putting
( )
( )Dq
q q q q
q q
=
- >
-
ì
í
ï
îï
ij ji ij ji
ji ij
if
otherwise
(A3)
we obtain firms’reaction function in terms of quality of services given by:
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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i j
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3
1
2
1
2
D
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(A4)
As it is immediate to verify, functions in (A4) have no intersection into the domain [ ]a a;
since they are parallel lines. These two lines are not overlapped since it is always true that
 
( ) ( )
2
1 1 6
3
0
1
2- +
>
g b qc cD
(A5)
Thus, firm j’s reaction line is always above to firm i’s one. Both reaction functions are continuous
and differentiable on our domain and they will be constant functions in correspondence of
domain’s extremes. As shown in figure 2, in correspondence of a certain quality level selected by
any firm we will have a best reply dynamics which suggests a continuos increase in quality
levels.
(INSERT FIG. 1)
Hence, for each network firm is convenient to increase product quality given any quality
level fixed by its rival. Using Weierstrass’s theorem, we can claim for a local maximum of profit
functions at the upper bound of our interval. Then, we have that in the second stage of the game
a Nash equilibrium exists and it is given by:
 ( ) ( )$ ¢ ¢ =! ; ;a a a ai j  where 
[ ]
( )a a a
a a a
=
Î
-argmax ;
;n
n n nP  for "n
Firms do not differentiate their services and they select the maximum level of quality. 
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 4:
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Substituting (10) and ( ) ( )¢ ¢ =a a a ai j; ; into (6), and maintaining previous assumptions,
we get first stage profits which now depend only on interconnection quality. Hence, each firm
maximises its profits with respect to qn n-  . From first order conditions we obtain, with some
calculations, firms’ reaction functions given by:
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
q q
f g b
g
q q
f g b
g
ij ji
ji ij
q q
c q
q q
c q
= -
- + -
-
= -
- + -
-
1 4 1
3 1
2 4 1
3 1
2 2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2
(A6)
As in Appendix 1, expressions (A6) are parallel lines and firm i’s reaction line is always
above of firm j’s one as it is easy to check using (A6). As above, some constant parts of reaction
functions arise given that even here we are working with a restricted domain. Best reply
dynamics states that whereas a network sets a certain level of interconnection quality its rival
will react choosing a lower level of q . This process will continue until the lower bound of the
domain of q  is reached (see figure 2):
(INSERT FIGURE 2)
Thus a subgame perfect equilibrium will be given by
  ( ) ( )$ ¢ ¢ =! ; ;q qij ji 0 0
Then, both networks will choose global degradation of connectivity. 
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    a j
    a rj
ri
a            ¢a i a a i
FIGURE 1
Second Stage Best Reply Dynamics
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q ij
  ri
1
        rj
     0 q ij
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       1                     q ij
FIGURE 2
First Stage Best Reply Dynamics
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